BPK Finds Control Weaknesses, INA-24 Spotlighted

The Jakarta Financial Audit Agency (BPK) building (BPK RI document)

JAKARTA - The Aids to Navigation (AToN) INA-24 project is a bilateral loan from the Indonesian Government from the Government of South Korea through the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) scheme worth USD 97.1 million.

The agreement was signed in 2016 for the procurement and installation of Navigation Aids (SBNP) in 24 strategic locations in Indonesia. With a tenor of 40 years and interest of 0.15 percent per year, this scheme is considered very soft. However, almost a decade has passed, the project has not been completed.

The Founding Secretary of Indonesian Audit Watch (IAW), Iskandar Sitorus, assessed that the stagnation of the project needed to be seen from the institutional dimension and the actors involved.

First, at the conceptual-planning level. As a national planner, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) has the authority to ensure that each foreign loan project meets technical, institutional, and implementation readiness before entering the Green Book.

"Normatively, projects that pass this stage are considered ready to be executed. If there are structural obstacles or weak implementation capacity, then the conceptual question leads to the quality of the initial design, including risk analysis and the readiness of the implementing institutions," said Iskandar, Tuesday, February 17.

Second, at the operational-technical level. The implementation of INA-24 is under the Ministry of Transportation, specifically the Directorate General of Maritime Transportation (Ditjen Hubla). At this stage, according to IAW, the responsibility lies with the Budget User Authority and the I-level ranks related to procurement management, contract control, and schedule deviation mitigation.

A number of findings of the Financial Audit Agency (BPK) in the financial statements and interim overview show weaknesses in internal control and delays in completing work. In the framework of state administration, repeated deviations without measurable corrective measures reflect weak risk management at the implementation level.

Third, at the policy and leadership level. In the presidential system, the Minister of Transportation is responsible for the performance of the ministry to the President. In the context of the Red and White Cabinet under President Prabowo Subianto, cross-era projects such as INA-24 are considered to be in the radar of strategic evaluation.

According to IAW, the indicator of institutional leadership can be seen from the existence of an acceleration roadmap, evaluation of project officials, re-coordination with the EDCF lender, and transparency of progress to the DPR and the public. Without clear policy interventions, operational stagnation has the potential to continue.

Beyond the three main actors, IAW also highlights the importance of the role of supervision and accompaniment. Iskandar asked the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia through the function of the State Attorney to provide legal assistance to ensure that the acceleration of the project does not pose a risk of administrative criminal liability.

"Optimizing this role is important so that technical officials have legal certainty in making strategic decisions," he said.

IAW suggests that the responsibility for the INA-24 project should be layered: Bappenas on the conceptual design, the Directorate General of Hubla on technical execution, the Minister of Transportation on policy direction and strategic control, and the President on collective government accountability.

"Project stagnation is not merely a technical problem, but a reflection of institutional coordination and the country's managerial capacity in managing bilateral loan commitments," said Iskandar.