There is an irony that is happening in the Free Nutritious Meal Program or MBG.
On the one hand, this program carries a big intention. The state wants to improve children's nutrition, reduce stunting, and prepare a healthier generation. There is nothing wrong with that ambition. In fact, this is the type of program that the people really need.
On the other hand, MBG is beginning to show the most vulnerable side of a giant project. It is growing very fast, while its supervisory system still has to be pursued.
In less than two years, MBG has become one of the largest social programs ever run by the Indonesian government. Millions of beneficiaries must be served. Thousands of kitchens must be prepared. Food supplies must be available every day. Partners must be verified. Distribution must be timely. Large budgets must be maintained so that they do not leak in the middle of the road.
Minister of Finance Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa said that the realization of the MBG budget until the end of May 2026 had reached IDR 88.15 trillion. The number of beneficiaries is said to have reached 63.1 million people, consisting of students, pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers, and toddlers. This figure shows an extraordinary scale. But precisely because it is extraordinary, the risk is also not small.
This case even dragged the BGN leadership. Former BGN Head Dadan Hindayana and two former Deputy Heads of BGN, Lodewyk Pusung and Sony Sonjaya, have been named as suspects by the Attorney General's Office. Nanik S. Deyang, who previously also served as Deputy Head of BGN, was then appointed as Head of BGN to replace Dadan.
The Attorney General's Office is still developing the case of alleged corruption in BGN. There are allegations of irregularities in the Nutrition Fulfillment Service Unit or SPPG incentives. There is also a spotlight on alleged transactional practices in the opening of the MBG kitchen. Not to mention the controversy over the procurement of electric motorcycles whose value is said to reach Rp. 1 trillion.
The government then took a number of steps. The development of SPPG was suspended. Governance was promised to be improved. Supervision will be tightened. This step is important. But it also leaves one big question. If the system has been running well since the beginning, why is a major improvement only being carried out now?
Here MBG seems to be facing the "curse of too big a project".
The problem is not with the purpose of the program. Children do need nutritious food. Pregnant women and toddlers do need state support. The 3T area also needs to get more attention.
The question is on the scale and speed. A program as large as MBG is not enough to be supported by the budget. It needs a strong system. Starting from the data of recipients, nutritional standards, supply chain, procurement of goods, selection of partners, kitchen supervision, to audits of the use of state funds.
Without a mature system, even good programs can turn into a room for deviation.
Other countries' experiences provide lessons. Brazil took more than half a century to build the National School Feeding Program or Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar (PNAE) to become one of the world's references. The program has its roots in 1955 and underwent important reforms in 2009, including through strengthening public oversight and the involvement of local family farmers.
India is also the same. The Mid-Day Meal program was started nationally in 1995 and continued to be improved after facing problems with food quality, distribution, and supervision.
The lesson is simple. Brazil and India didn't just build programs. They built systems. Indonesia seems to be trying to do both at once: expanding programs while pursuing surveillance system readiness.
At that point, the risk arises. When expansion is faster than supervision, the gap of deviation opens. Not always because of bad intentions, but because the system has not been able to control the intricacies of work in the field.
Therefore, the case that is now entangled in BGN should not only be read as a common legal case. This is not just about who is the suspect. It is not just about who is removed and who is appointed as a replacement. The more important question is whether the country has a strong enough tool to oversee a program as large as MBG.
The challenge will be even more difficult when the Head of BGN Nanik S. Deyang encourages MBG to focus more on reaching the 3T area. Socially, the direction is right. The lagging, leading, and outermost areas do need more attention.
However, in terms of governance, the 3T area also presents a higher risk. Limited infrastructure. Expensive logistics access. Supervision is more difficult to do.
Nanik also proposed the use of school canteens that meet standards and open up opportunities for state-owned enterprises' CSR support for supporting facilities. This idea is interesting because it can make MBG more adaptive to field conditions.
But the involvement of many actors requires clear rules of the game. Who can be a partner. How the quality standards of food are maintained. How state money and CSR funds are separated. How school canteens are supervised. All of this must be clear from the start.
Therefore, the size of MBG's success should not be calculated only from the number of kitchens built, the number of beneficiaries, or the size of the absorbed budget. The more important measure is whether the food really reaches those who are entitled to it, with decent quality, without leakage along the way.
The public certainly wants MBG to succeed. This program is too important to fail. But precisely because it is important, it must not be managed with a sense of urgency.
In a project of this size, the biggest threat is not just a lack of budget. The biggest threat is when the program grows faster than the system that oversees it.
The English, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, and French versions are automatically generated by the AI. So there may still be inaccuracies in translating, please always see Indonesian as our main language. (system supported by DigitalSiber.id)
