G30S، انقلاب الزحف، وأصوات من داخل السجون

Political prisoners due to the G30S incident in LP Cipinang between 1965-1966 (Source: Co Rentmeester)

JAKARTA - The violence that occurred during late 1965 to early 1966 can be seen as the beginning of the construction of a new regime. Many people call the transition from the Old Order to the New Order a coup d'etat by General Suharto. The General did not immediately "attack" the Palace but undermined Soekarno's power from below, then made Sukarno's loyalists as political prisoners, until finally he completely castrated Bung Besar's power.

John Roosa in his book Excuses of Mass Murder: The September 30 Movement and Suharto's Coup (2008) mentions Suharto and other high-ranking army officers using the September 30 Movement (G30S) as a pretext to establish a military dictatorship in this country. "They need to create a national emergency and a completely chaotic atmosphere if they are to overthrow an entire generation of nationalists and wipe out President Soekarno's populist ideals," Roosa wrote.

Suharto and other military leaders knew that they would face severe resistance if the military launched a coup against Sukarno directly. Instead of attacking the palace first, Suharto "attacked the community with lightning-fast violence, then by trampling on the people who were gripped by fear and confusion walked into the palace."

However, Suharto denied responsibility for the mass violence of 1965-66. In the official notes submitted by the New Order regime it was stated that the "annihilation of the PKI" had been carried out through administrative actions and without bloodshed. Suspected people were arrested, examined to make sure they were guilty or not, then divided into three groups (A, B, and C) according to their level of involvement in the G30S, and then imprisoned.

Political Prisoners due to the G30S incident in Cipinang Prison between 1965-1966 (Source: Co Rentmeester)

But with the fall of the Suharto government in May 1998, many new facts began to be revealed. Not a few writers have used the freedom of the press to publish articles critical of the official version of the events of 1965. One of them, Soebandrio, the former first deputy prime minister under Soekarno, who was imprisoned during Suharto's reign, published his analysis of the G30S in 2001.

Soebandrio's testimony

According to Soebandrio in his writing entitled My Testimony About the G30S, several days after the G30S the massacre of PKI members and their families began. The PKI was accused of being the mastermind behind the G30S. Since then Indonesia has been flooded with blood.

"It was not only PKI leaders who were attacked, but all those who smelled of PKI were massacred without any legal process. In cities, villages, hamlets, in various corners of the country massacres were carried out, a very horrific act."

The PKI massacre began shortly after President Soekarno announced (October 3, 1965) that the Commander of the Kostrad Major General Suharto was entrusted with the executor of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib). "I didn't expect that this judicial institution would become so feared by the people. Just by mentioning Kopkamtib, people are already horrified."

A few years later the name was changed to Bakorstanas, but it was still a frightening name for the people. All actions of the people that were not in accordance with Suharto's wishes were definitely crushed by Kopkamtib which later changed its name to Bakorstanas or Bakorstanasda in the regions.

"This institution became Suharto's weapon to crush people who did not agree with his wishes. This development was certainly beyond Bung Karno's expectations as the author of the power," said Soebandrio.

Former Deputy Prime Minister of the era of President Soekarno, Soebandrio (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Suharto's power strengthened with the emergence of the March 11, 1966 Warrant, known as Supersemar. Until the next day Suharto announced the disbandment of the PKI.

Six days later 15 ministers who were still active were arrested. The reason is so that the ministers do not become victims of the people's uncontrollable anger.

But Suharto also presented contradictory reasons, namely: the ministers are just assistants to the president, not a collective form of government. So it could be arrested. "The accusation is easy: involvement in the G30S/PKI. An accusation that all Indonesians feared during Suharto's reign. Criticizing the policies of the Suharto government could be accused by the PKI," said Soebandrio.

The 15 ministers arrested include:

Soebandrio (Vice Prime Minister (Waperdam)-I concurrently Foreign Minister, concurrently Head of BPI) Waperdam-II Chaerul Saleh Minister of Electricity S. Reksoprojo Minister of Basic Education and Culture Sumardjo Minister of Finance Oei Tjoe Tat Minister of Central Bank and BI Governor Yusuf Muda In Minister of Mines Armunanto Minister of Irrigation and Village Development Ir. Surahman Minister of Labor Sutomo Martoprojo Minister of Justice Andjarwinata Minister of Information Asmuadi Minister of Security Affairs Lt. Col. Imam Syafi'i Minister Secretary of the National Front Ir. Tualaka Minister of Transmigration and Cooperatives Ahmadi Minister of Home Affairs concurrently Governor of Greater Jakarta Sumarno Sastrowidjojo Voice from prison

After being arrested they were immediately detained. Soebandrio himself was later tried at the Extraordinary Military Court on charges of subversion and sentenced to death. Legal pathways above court decisions - such as appeals and cassation - are deliberately closed.

"Obviously I was devastated at that time. From the position of the number two person in the Republic, I was suddenly tried as a criminal and sentenced to death," said Soebandrio.

He then served his initial sentence at the Cimahi Prison in Bandung. There Soebandrio met people who shared the same fate as him. One of them was Lekol Untung, who was the commander of the G30S.

"Me and Untung have both been sentenced to death. Neither I nor Untung have been given the right to take a higher legal route, namely an appeal, let alone an cassation," wrote Soebandrio.

Until one day in late 1966 Untung was picked up from his cell by several guards. His end is near. Those were Untung's last moments in his life. And Ahmad Durmawel, the military prosecutor who tried Soebandrio, reported that Soebandrio would be executed four days later.

"Mr. Ban, goodbye. Don't be sad. We will meet again there in four days, he said, pointing up," wrote Soebandrio imitating Untung's words. Soebandrio said, Untung spoke in a trembling voice. His eyes glazed over. He didn't cry, but Soebandrio knew deep down he was in a state of panic.

"The brave soldier didn't cry, but I knew he was in a state of panic. He really didn't expect Suharto to betray him," he wrote.

After Untung was executed, a miracle came to Soebandrio. President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson and Queen of England Elizabeth, unknown to Soebandrio, sent a wire letter to Suharto.

"The point reads like this: Don't shoot Soebandrio. I know that in the G30S he wasn't involved... It turned out that the short wire was incredibly effective. In the end, I wasn't shot dead," said Soebandrio.

Pretext of mass murder

In his memoirs Suharto wrote that his strategy to "quell the PKI" was "pursuit, purge and annihilation." It does not tell the reader that anyone has died in the process. Government-sponsored films about the movement also do not depict mass arrests and killings.

The last panel on the relief of the Pancasila Sakti Monument shows Lieutenant Colonel Untung in front of the Mahmilub, as if a cool-headed legal process was the only form of military reaction to the movement. No memorial was built at the Pancasila Sakti Monument for hundreds of thousands of victims.

When referring to the violence that occurred, Suharto explained it as something that stems from conflict in society. In a 1971 speech, he delivered an analysis of the causes of the murder in one short sentence.

"Thousands of victims fell in the regions because the people acted individually. Also because of the bad prejudices between groups that had been instilled for years by very narrow political practices," said Suharto.

John Roosa in Pretext of Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and the Suharto Coup (2008) mentions that many Indonesians, even those who are usually critical of state propaganda, believe that the killings were acts of violence that occurred spontaneously from below. The killing, said Roosa, was considered a wild trial of the people's security ranks, which accompanied the military's well-controlled and well-organized effort to suppress the PKI insurgency.

"Due to ignorance of events taking place in other areas, people who witnessed military-organized massacres in their area of residence may regard these killings as an exception. Lack of open discussion and thorough investigation of the massacres that took place has created great uncertainty about the general pattern of this crime," Roosa wrote.

*Read other information about NEW ORDE or read other interesting articles from Ramdan Febrian Arifin.

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